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Chapter 1
Detecting Libor Manipulation
1.1 Introduction
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is a set of benchmark interest rates, in-
tended to reflect the average rate at which banks can borrow unsecured funds from
other banks, to which trillions of dollars of financial contracts are explicitly tied.1 It
also serves as a component in many models used to value a wide range of assets not
explicitly tied to the rate. The British Bankers Association (BBA), the licensor of the
rate, has called it “the most important number in the world.” The rate is set each day by
taking the truncated average of the reported borrowing costs of a panel of large banks.
During the upheaval in financial markets that began around August 2007, the Libor be-
gan to diverge from some of its historic relationships causing observers to question its
proper functioning and some to suggest manipulation by panel banks as the cause of the
malfunction. Subsequent research led to investigations by regulators around the world
and, by July of 2012, culminated in admissions of manipulation by Barclays, UBS, and
1Partially overlapping panels, administered by the Brittish Bankers’ Association, determine
rates in 10 different currencies and maturities ranging from overnight to twelve months.
1
the Royal Bank of Scotland.2 3
Much of the public research and discussion of Libor manipulation to date has focused
on panel bank incentives, particularly at the height of the crisis, to intentionally report
interbank funding costs below actual costs in order to burnish the markets’ perception
of their riskiness.4 The primary focus of this paper is another source of manipulation
incentives: Panel bank portfolio exposure to the Libor. As revealed in the July 2012
Barclay’s admission of manipulation, released as part of a settlement with U.S. and
U.K. regulators, individual traders from that bank (and others) had occasionally con-
tacted colleagues responsible for quote submission to request a submission favorable to
their trading positions and these requests were often accommodated.
In this paper, we formulate tests of such portfolio driven manipulation based on a simple
model of bank quote submissions. In the model, bank profits depend on the actual fix
of the rate but they face misreporting costs that are increasing as the reported cost
diverges further from the truth. We interpret the dependence of profits on the rate itself
as the bank’s (or one of a bank’s traders) portfolio incentives and the misreporting costs
as detection costs. The model predicts, in the presence of this type of misreporting
incentive, a particular form of ”bunching” in the intraday distribution of Libor quotes.
The prediction is due to the form of the rate setting mechanism, which takes the average
of the interquartile quotes submitted by the panel banks. If a given bank wants to change
the overall Libor (as opposed to simply reporting costs) and it has a good forecast of
the location of the pivotal quotes-those quotes above or below which the quote will not
participate in the average-its own quotes will tend to bunch around these pivotal quotes.
Outside these pivotal quotes its marginal impact on the rate, and thus the marginal profit
of misreporting, goes to zero while its marginal misreporting cost increases.
2An earlier version of this paper, that predates these investigations and contains additional
analysis, is available on the authors’ webpage. In February 2012 it was announced that UBS
had admitted to manipulating the Yen Libor, while Barclays has admitted to manipulating the
Dollar Libor.
3Most of these investigations are ongoing as of the writing of this draft.
4See Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008) Wall Street Journal report for an early, influential
argument along these lines.
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In our empirical analysis, we aim to statistically distinguish “too much” bunching of a
given bank’s quotes around the pivotal quotes, relative to a plausible joint distribution
of true borrowing costs. Without much a priori information on the joint distribution of
actual borrowing costs this is challenging as different such distributions can display an
arbitrarily high degree of bunching of individual quotes around a given rank quote. To
address this our testing strategy compares the amount of bunching around pivotal quotes
in the actual cross sectional distribution of quotes with that of a plausible benchmark
distribution estimated by fitting a vector autoregression model to the vector of quotes.
The primary assumption embodied by this specification is that in the long run, bank
borrowing costs should be correlated through similarities in the banks themselves. It is
natural to think, for example, that U.S. based banks should have positively correlated
costs or that all banks with large retail operations should have correlated interbank
borrowing costs. The crucial contrast here is that the benchmark distribution rules out
long run relationships between a bank’s borrowing costs and the borrowing cost of a
day’s fourth, or any other, rank bank. This exclusion is our source of identification.
The specific predictions of our model allow us to argue we distinguish portfolio driven
incentives from other sources of manipulation incentives and from generic market fric-
tions, unrelated to manipulation, that may cause divergence between Libor rates and
other, comparable rates. In the reputational theory of misreporting, for example, each
bank should only care about the markets’ perception of its own individual quote not
on the overall fix of the rate. Though these market perceptions themselves may de-
pend on an individual bank’s position relative to other banks, there is no reason to
think the market should condition this perception on a bank’s position relative to the
pivotal quotes specifically. The welfare and legal ramifications of Libor manipula-
tion may depend crucially on distinguishing these sources of misreporting incentives.
While manipulation driven by reputation concerns allow for a maintaining-stability-
in-the-public-interest type justification, portfolio related incentives allow for no such
rationalization; to the extent that manipulation helped a bank’s bottom line they must
have hurt another party’s. Distinguishing these sources is also important in determining
an appropriate policy fix of the problem. For example, one suggested fix has been mak-
ing individual submissions anonymous. This makes sense in the presence of reputation
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related incentives, however, in the presence of trading related incentives such a change
could exacerbate the problem by decreasing detection costs.
Despite the “smoking gun” evidence of portfolio-driven manipulation turned up in reg-
ulatory investigations, our results are not of just academic interest. The general picture
of manipulation, painted by colorful emails discovered and testimony given, is one of
the infrequent and idiosyncratic behavior of a few traders at a few banks. Our results,
by their very strength, suggest otherwise. The nature of our tests are such that their
power will depend on the prevalence of portfolio driven manipulation. We find strong
statistical evidence of the bunching pattern predicted by our model even while taking
pains to attribute the observed variation in quotes to plausible variation in costs. More-
over, we find evidence of manipulation in the more recent past, even as the turmoil
of financial crisis had receded somewhat. Our tests of manipulation are also able to
pick up smaller deviations than those based on no-arbitrage arguments which, by their
nature, are too coarse to detect deviations as small as one basis point or less.
This paper is related to a long literature that attempts to detect hidden corruption and
conspiracies by using forensic methods based on economic models of cheating. The
contexts for these studies is diverse, ranging from sport (Wolfers (2006)), to standard-
ized testing in schools (Jacob and Levitt (2003)) to international development (Olken
and Barron (2009)) and politics (Ferraz and Finan (2008)). Zitzewitz (2012) surveys
the broad literature on these forensic methods. Harrington (2005), Porter (2005) and
Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2010) survey a long literature specifically on detecting price
fixing cartels.
Though Snider and Youle (2010) was the first academic paper to explore the implica-
tions of and evidence for portfolio-driven manipulation, there has also been some other
academic work relating to detecting manipulation of the Libor specifically. The study
of Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) is the first such work of this kind to our knowledge and
preceded the original version of this paper. The authors apply a screen for collusion
developed by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), finding suspicious patterns. Abrantes-Metz
et al. (2011) apply a test based on Benford’s Law, a statistical regularity in the distribu-
tion of digits in data sets, to Libor submissions and again find highly irregular patterns.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the history of the Libor,
its recent strange behavior, and the most recent findings of regulatory investigations.
Section 3 lays out a simple model of portfolio driven manipulation and performs some
numerical experiments that motivate our tests. Section 4 examines the empirical evi-
dence, develops tests for our theory, and describes our results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Libor
Libor is intended to represent the rate at which banks in London offer unsecured Eu-
rodollar deposits. Eurodollars are simply dollar deposits held outside the U.S. and thus
outside the U.S. regulatory and Federal Reserve system. The rates and basic rate setting
process emerged in the 1980’s in response to the rise of derivatives market and the sub-
sequent demand for standardized, uniform Eurodollar rates to write into these contracts
(Stigum and Creszensi (2007) ch. 7). The usage and importance of the rate grew with
derivatives market and, by 2007, over $300 trillion worth of contracts explicitly refer-
enced it. They have also become ubiquitous benchmark rates used for the valuation of
a wide range of assets that are not explicitly tied to Libor.
In their Wall Street Journal article, Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008) brought public
attention to the strange behavior of the rates during the financial crisis. Among other
evidence, they showed panel bank rate submissions were out of line with what one
would expect from credit default swap (CDS) spreads, essentially the premia on insur-
ing against individual firm default risk, of those banks. If bank dollar borrowing costs
were entirely driven by default risk, these premia should be tightly correlated with rate
submissions. Indeed, in a frictionless world no arbitrage conditions suggest a bank’s
borrowing cost should be very close to the risk free rate plus that bank’s CDS spread.
In Snider and Youle (2010), we document additionally, at the bank level, within bank
changes in CDS spreads have had little explanatory power in determining rate submis-
sions or a bank’s rank in the panel.
Further strange behavior can be seen in Libor’s divergence from similar rates. The
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Eurodollar bid rate is an aggregation of actual bids by market makers in the Eurodollar
market. Prior to August 2007, the Eurodollar bid rate and Libor behaved as we might
expect a bid-ask spread to behave; Libor submissions are a bank’s perceived ask rate
they would face in the Eurodollar market. Figure 1 shows the spread between Libor
and Eurodollar bid rate from January 2005 to July 2012. Banks submitted quotes over
the pre-August 2007 period ranged between 6 and 12 basis points above the Eurodollar
bid rate. Around August 2007, bank quotes and the resulting Libor fixing fell below the
Eurodollar bid rate. As shown in the figure, Libor rates remained well below Eurodollar
bid rate, 10-40 basis points, until late summer of 2011 when the spread climbed sharply
and again became positive in early 2012. Incidentally, this sharp rise in the spread
toward the end of the sample period was preceded by an announcement that UBS was
cooperating with antitrust enforcers, making the graph suggestive of cartel breakdown
episodes.
Kuo et al. (2012) compare Libor submissions with bank bids in the Federal Reserve
Term Auction Facility (TAF) and inferred term borrowing costs derived from FedWire,
the reporting system for actual interbank transactions within the Federal Reserve system
(See Kuo et al. (2013) for a description). They find Libor submissions were 10-30
basis points lower than the comparison rates in the immediate aftermath of the Bear
Stearns and Lehman Failures. Over other periods, however, they find that Libor rates
are statistically indistinguishable from the comparison rates.
In recent testimony to the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Com-
mittee on Libor reform, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler provides a thorough discus-
sion and graphical review of the suspicious patterns in Libor based on the logic of no-
arbitrage and similar arguments (Gensler (2012)). Notable in the presentation of these
results is that the anomalous behavior of Libor rates appear to persist to the present. We
omit a full rehash of all this evidence and refer the interested reader to this testimony
and the wealth of other sources now available.
The divergence of Libor rates from comparable rates and the apparent violations of no
arbitrage conditions suggest some form of malfunction in the determination of these
rates. However, many areas of financial markets have seen logical and historic rela-
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tionships upset since the onset of the financial crisis so simple malfunction does not
imply the divergence is due to manipulation. Term, unsecured interbank lending mar-
kets experienced dramatic illiquidity problems beginning with the onset of the financial
crisis and persisting to the present (Kuo et al. (2013), Afonso et al. (2011), Wheatley
(2012)). Liquidity and related issues in comparison markets, e.g. CDS markets, cast
further doubt on the reliability of tests based on pre-crisis history or models of friction-
less markets. Moreover, even in the best of times, statistical tests of violations of these
logical and historic relationships are relatively coarse and unable to distinguish small
deviations that we expect the portfolio driven manipulation to create.
1.2.1 Investigations and Admissions
By July of 2012, regulators around the world, spurred by the evidence discussed above,
had opened investigations into the Libor submission process of most Dollar Libor panel
banks as well as banks in various other currency panels. Most of these investigations are
ongoing but in July 2012 the CFTC, Department of Justice, and UK Financial Services
Administration had announced they had settled with Barclays over Libor manipulation.
The bank agreed to pay a fine totalling over $400 million and also agreed to a public
release of findings from the investigation. The findings reveal that both reputation
driven and portfolio driven incentives caused upper level bank management, in the
former case, and individual traders, in the later case to request particular quotes or a
particular direction of quotes from the bank’s Libor submitters dating back to at least
2005.
Not surprisingly, the reputation incentive appears to have been at work primarily during
the hectic depths of the financial crisis. As the subprime crisis started to heat up in the
middle of 2007, Barclays relatively high Libor submissions, in conjunction with the
bank’s access of the Bank of England Emergency Lending Facility and reports of high
exposure to subprime SIVs, began receiving negative press and market reaction. On
September 3, 2007, Barclays quotes were 6-9bps above the next highest submission in
three Dollar tenors and near the top of the range in most others. A Bloomberg column,
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published that day, entitled “Barclays Takes a Money Market Beating”, discussing the
high quotes, ends with the ominous “There’s knowledge buried in the price that Bar-
clays is being charged in the money markets. We just don’t know what that knowledge
is yet” (Gilbert (2007)).
In response to the negative press, senior Barclays management directed submitters to
start “keep[ing] their heads below the pararpet”, to avoid a negative reaction from the
markets (Commission (2012) p.19). For example,
“On November 29, 2007 the supervisor of the U.S. Dollar Libor sub-
mitters convened a telephone discussion with the senior Barclays Treasury
managers and the U.S. Dollar Libor submitters. The supervisor said if
the submitters submitted the rate for a particular tenor at 5.50, which was
the rate they believed to by the appropriate submission, Barclays would
be 20 basis points above ‘the pack’ and ‘it’s going to cause a shit storm.’
The supervisor asked the issue be taken ‘upstairs’ meaning that it should
be discussed among the more senior levels of Barclays management. The
most senior Barclays treasury manager agreed that he would do so. For the
Libor submission, the group decided to compromise by determining to set
at the same level as another bank, a rate of 5.3, which was, again, not the
rate the submitters believed to be appropriate for Barclays.” (Ibid. p.21)
Barclays management and treasury staff believed they were following the lead of other
banks and the market reaction, singling them out, associated with not doing so would
be unjustified and that this was leading the overall Libor to remain much lower than
actual average costs. In the same November 29, 2007 discussion,
“the group also discussed their belief that other banks were submit-
ting unrealistically low rates and speculated that other banks were basing
submissions on derivatives positions...One of the senior Barclays Treasury
managers called a BBA representative and stated that he believed that Li-
bor panel banks, including Barclays, were submitting rates that were too
low because they were afraid to ‘stick their heads above the parapet’ and
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that ‘no one will get out of the pack, the pack sort of stays low.’ ” (Ibid
p.21)
As the previous quote also indicates, those in the know suspected manipulation due to
trading incentives during the financial crisis. The CFTC order reveals such behavior
predated the crisis, going back at least to early 2005, and continued until at least into
2009.5 Unlike the misreporting for reputation reasons, misreporting for trading rea-
sons seems to have been initiated by individual traders and there is no evidence it was
approved by upper level management. Requests from traders usually have come via,
often casual and jocular, emails and instant messages mostly asking for changes, both
high and low, in the one and three month dollar Libor. For example, a February 1, 2006
message from a Barclays trader in New York to a trader in London read
“You need to take a look at the reset ladder. We need 3M to stay low
for the next 3 sets and then I think we will be completely out of our 3M
position. Then its on. [Submitter] has to go crazy with raising 3M Libor.”
(Ibid. p.9)
Several communications between the traders and submitters reveal an awareness of the
particulars of the rate setting process. Specifically, traders sometimes requested that
submitters report rates that would get the submission “kicked out” or “knocked out” of
the panel, i.e. a quote outside the interquartile range. For example, a November 22,
2005 message from a senior trader in New York to a Trader in London,
“WE HAVE TO GET KICKED OUT OF THE FIXINGS TOMOR-
ROW!! We need a 4.17 fix in 1m (low fix) We need a 4.41 fix in 3m.” (Ibid
p.9)
Several communications also reveal awareness of detection costs in the form of regula-
tor discovery and punishment. For example, a March 13, 2006 email exchange between
5Some accounts have Libor manipulation going as far back as the early 1990s. See Dou-
glas Keenan’s July 26, 2012 Financial Times op-ed “My Thwarted Attempt to Tell of Libor
Shenanigans.”
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a Barclay’s trader in New York and a Libor submitter,
Trader: “The big day [has] arrived...My NYK are screaming at me
about an unchanged 3m libor. As always any help wd be greatly appre-
ciated. What do you think you’ll go for 3m?”
Submitter: “I am going 90 although 91 is what I should be posting.”
Trader: “[...] when I retire and write a book about this business your
name will be written in golden letters[...].”
Submitter: “I would prefer this [to] not be in any book!” (UK Financial
Services Authority Final Notice p.12)
The language and frequency of requests suggests that traders believed their requests
would be routinely accommodated by rate submitters. The UK FSA analyzed around
100 email and instant message requests uncovered by their investigation and found
that rate submissions were consistent with the requests about 70% of the time. The
Barclays communications also implicated at least four other banks, as yet unnamed,
for cooperating with the requests of Barclay’s traders. This, along with the fact that
the Barclay’s investigation found evidence of many attempts to influence submissions
to the Euribor panel, a similar Euro rate with around 40 panelists so no substantial
movement could not be accomplished by a single bank, suggests that many banks must
have participated in manipulation.
1.3 A Simple Model of Quote Submission
We model the quote submission process as a game played between the Libor panel
banks. There are 16 banks indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., 16. Each day the banks choose
their quotes qi. Bank i’s actual borrowing cost is given by ci drawn from some joint
distribution H(c1, c2, ..., c16) some part of which may be private information to the
bank. We denote the vector of 16 quotes and costs as q and c respectively. The Libor
fix is a function of submitted quotes and is given by:
10
L(q) =
1
8
16∑
j=1
1
{
qj > s
4, qj ≤ s12
}
qj
Where s4 is the day’s fourth highest, or left, pivotal quote and s12 is the days twelfth
highest or right pivotal quote.
Banks may have incentive to manipulate the fix because their final payoffs depend on
the realization of it. A bank will, however, not want to submit a quote too far from its
actual cost because doing so risks detection and punishment. Specifically we model a
bank’s expected payoff by:
pii = Eq−i [viL(q)−
δ
2
(qi − ci)2]
Given its information a bank chooses its quote to maximize this expected payoff. The
first order condition determining the bank’s best response is given by:
vi
8δ
∫
1
{
qi > s
4(q), qi ≤ s12(q)
}
Fi(dq−i)− (qi − c i) = 0
Where Fi is bank i’s beliefs about the distribution of other quotes conditional on its
information. LettingGi(qi) denote bank i’s equilibrium beliefs about the probability its
quote participates, in the truncated average, the equilibrium relationship between costs
and quotes is:
qi = ci +
vi
8δ
Gi(qi)
When the location of the pivotal quotes are known with certainty, as in the complete
information version of the game, the G function is a step function that is one for quotes
between the pivotal quotes and zero outside. Figure 1.2 shows a schematic represen-
tation of how these manipulation incentives affect the intraday distribution of quotes
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vis a vis the intraday distribution of costs. In the figure four banks, e, f, h, and j, have
incentive to push the rate down. All four banks equate the marginal benefit of skewing
their quote, v
8
G(qi), with the marginal cost, δ(qi − ci), where v is negative (i.e. the
incentive is to push the rate down). Banks e and f’s marginal cost function intersects
the marginal benefit function at it’s discontinuity, which occurs at the fourth highest
quote, d. The quotes of e and f are thus identical to the quote of d and there is bunching
at the fourth.
1.3.1 Numerical Experiments
Figure 1.3 shows some results of a numerical experiment and foreshadows our testing
approach. In the pictured experiment, we assume that there are 12 banks, named bank
1-bank12, that occasionally attempt to manipulate the rate. Banks 13-16 never attempt
to manipulate the rate. Underlying bank costs are drawn from a normal distribution
with mean 1 and covariance matrix set to match the empirical covariance matrix of
Libor quotes less the daily mean quote over the period January 2005 to July 2012. The
strength of manipulation in each period, vit
8δ
, are i.i.d draws from a mixture distribution
with 4/5 probability of no manipulation, i.e. vit
8δ
= 0 for all banks, and 1/5 probability
that each of the 12 manipulating banks have incentives drawn uniform on [−1/24, 0].
For each of 10000 runs of the model, we calculate equilibrium quotes for the static,
complete information game.6
The top panel of figure 1.3 shows the distribution of quotes of manipulator bank 1
less the day’s fourth lowest among the 15 other banks (blue bars). Also shown is the
distribution of bank 1’s actual costs minus the fourth lowest actual cost among the
15 other banks (white bars) and the distribution of simulated quotes less the simulated
fourth lowest actual cost of the 15 other banks (red bars), where the quotes are simulated
from a fitted multivariate normal distribution. The bottom panel of figure 1.3 shows the
6There are, in general, multiple equilibria for a given vector of costs. For these experiments
we focus on the maximally distored equilibrium, the equilbrium with the largest average differ-
ence between costs and quotes. In an earlier version we showed that all complete information
equilibria display the same type of bunching we focus on here.
12
same distributions for the non-manipulating bank 16. The pooled empirical distribution
of bank 1’s normalized quotes displays a large discontinuity at 0 relative to the pooled
distribution of bank 16’s normalized quotes and the simulated distribution.
In our empirical analysis our testing procedure is guided by these experiments with the
model. Namely, we test whether the pooled distribution of actual, normalized quotes
has more mass around 0 than that of a reference distribution. We also test for the
presence of a discontinuity at 0 in the distribution of normalized quotes relative to a
reference distribution.
A priori, it is likely our tests will be prone to power and size issues. Clearly power will
be affected by not only sample size but also by the strength of manipulation incentives
since these will affect how frequently the optimal misreported quote will be identical to
one of the pivots. Type I errors are also an issue because whenever a non-manipulating
bank receives a cost draw that puts it in a pivotal position, manipulating banks will
push their own quotes toward the non-manipulator causing the non-manipulator’s nor-
malized quote to, itself, be close to 0. Intuitively, even if we were willing to assume the
cost distribution was perfectly smooth and exact ties a zero probability occurrence, in
observing two banks tied at the fourth lowest we would not be able to say which bank
was manipulating or if both were. We explore these issues by performing a series of
monte carlo experiments, mimicking our empirical tests, on simulated data generated
by our simple model.
Table 1.1 shows the results of these experiments. Each entry in the table reports a
summary statistic for the distribution of one sided t-test p-values obtained from simu-
lating the model 1000 times for each associated parameterization. The hypothes tested
is that the number of actual quotes, normalized by subtracting the day’s fourth lowest
quote, falling in the bin 1 basis point below the fourth lowest ([−.01, 0)) is less then
the simulated number of normalized quotes falling into this bin.7 The rows in the table
7We have run similar tests for an “Above” hypothesis that the number of normalized actual
quotes falling in the bin 1bp above the fourth lowest is greater than the simulated number, and
also a “Diff” hypothesis that the difference in the number of actual normalized quotes falling
above and below is greater than the difference in the number of simulated normalized quotes.
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report the average p-value, fraction of tests rejected at the 5% level, and the fraction
of tests rejected at the 1% level and these are shown for a manipulator (Bank 1) and
non-manipulator (Bank 16) for each of the parameterizations.
For each, simulation we maintain the assumption that there are 12 potential manip-
ulators and bank costs are drawn from a joint normal distribution with mean 1 and
covariance matrix equal to the empirical covariance matrix of 3 month Libor quotes
less the daily mean quote.8 Across experiments we vary the sample size and two pa-
rameters controlling the frequency of manipulation and the strength of manipulation
incentives. The “Fraction of manipulating days” parameter determines the fraction of
days on which there is potentially any manipulation so a parameter value of .33 means
that on 2/3 of days no banks have any manipulation incentives ( vi
8δ
= 0,∀i). On days in
which manipulation is possible the strength of manipulation incentives are determined
by the “Distribution of Incentives” parameter. On these days each of the 12 banks re-
ceives an incentive, vi
8δ
, drawn iid across banks and days, from a mixture distribution
with a 50% probability of getting a 0 draw and 50% probability of getting a draw from
the uniform [−x, 0] distribution, where x is either 1/8, 1/24, or 1/40.
A first observation about the table is that each of the tests, evidently, allow us to dis-
tinguish the manipulating bank from the non-manipulator. On average, the distribution
of manipulator quotes will have less mass, relative to the comparison distribution, just
below the pivotal quote. A manipulator will also have more mass just above and a
greater difference in the mass just above and just below. The “Above” and “Diff” tests
appear to do a much better job both of identifying the manipulator and distinguishing
the manipulator from the non-manipulator than does the ”Below” test. However, un-
like the former two the apparent ability of the “Below” test to contrast the two types
They give similar results
8Assuming that fewer banks are potential manipulators makes it easier to distiguish the
manipulator from the non-manipulator since there are more cost events that lead to a non-
manipulator being bunched at the lower pivot. For example, with only one manipulator a non-
manipulating bank will only be bunched at the lower pivot in the event that the non-manipulator
receives the fourth highest cost draw and the cost and incentives draw of the manipulator causes
it to misreport at the same level as the non-manipulator.
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improves, in the sense that the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null decreases for
the manipulator while the probability of correctly rejecting the null for the manipulator
improves for the “Below” test, whereas the other two tests increase the probability of
correctly rejecting for the manipulator but also increase the probability of incorrectly
rejecting for the non-manipulator.
Since our cost parameterization comes directly from the data, the table is also infor-
mative about the relationship between test statistics and the underlying frequency and
intensity of manipulation. When manipulation is less frequent and/or incentives are
weaker, the tests in summarized in the table have low power, only rejecting the null of
no manipulation at the 5% level in 50-60% of those samples with 150 or 250 observa-
tions for the bottom rows of the table where the frequency and strength of manipulation
is lowest. The simulated libor in this scenario is, on average .22 bp lower than what
would prevail with honest reporting. By contrast, in the parameterization in the top
rows of the table, where the null is correctly rejected for a manipulating bank at the 5%
level 97-100% of the time, the average realized libor is .83 bp lower than what would
prevail with honest reporting. These magnitudes suggest two things. First, our tests are
able to detect deviations that are relatively small, when compared to day to day changes
in quotes for instance, on average. Second, they suggest a ballpark lower bound on the
frequency and intensity of manipulation incentives that we might infer from the strong
rejection evidence we find our empirical analysis.
1.4 Data and Empirical Evidence
Our empirical analysis utilizes only data on bank rate submissions. The quotes of
each panel bank on every business day from January 1, 2005 to July 1, 2012 were
collected from a Bloomberg terminal. We focus on 3 month Dollar Libor submissions
over the period ending February 1, 2011 when the panel increased to 21 members.
From January 1, 2005 to February 1, 2011 the panel consisted the same 16 members
with the exception of one change occurring in February 2009 when Societe General
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replaced HBOS following the absorption of HBOS by Lloyd’s. Motivated by a visual
examination of the Eurodollar bid rate-Libor spread shown in Figure 1.1 we split the
sample up into 6 periods and perform our analysis on the full sample as well as on each
period individually.
Table 1.2 shows some summary statistics for this sample over the various periods. On
average, quotes are tightly clustered with an interquartile range of deviations from the
median quote ranging from one basis point below to two basis points below. Similarly
the interquartile range, the difference between the upper and lower pivotal quotes is
quite narrow. Overall, the average size of the range is 7.9 bps, though there is a good
deal of variation across our periods, with the range varying from 3.4 bps in the first
year and a half of the sample to 48bps in the period containing the Lehman failure.
Also notable is that, while the ranking of banks in the panel tends to be persistent,
there is still considerable variation in relative ranks over time with the daily standard
deviation of a bank’s rank from its average rank at 4.39. Moreover, nearly all banks
occupy almost all ranks over a sufficiently long horizon. Significant variation in these
relative quotes will be important for our testing strategy below.
As noted by Gensler (2012), one of the puzzling features of bank quote behavior is
the lack of day to day movement in the submissions. Across all periods and all banks,
over 40% of observations show no change from the previous day’s quote in spite of
significant day to day changes in related rates. An interesting regime change seems
to appear in the last 15 months of the summarized sample the number of such zeros
jumps to 62% of observations. The lack of comovement of quotes with underlying
“cost drivers” (as well as the lack of much movement at all) is the logic behind the
collusion tests examined in Abrates Metz et. al (2012).
1.4.1 Empirical Approach
Our model predicts that when banks have direct incentive to manipulate rates, as op-
posed to misreporting for other reasons, e.g. reputation, their quotes will bunch around
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the pivotal quotes. Without placing restrictions on the joint distribution of bank quotes
over time, obviously any distribution of quotes can be rationalized as truthful by some
joint distribution of underlying costs. However, since different distributions will natu-
rally display different degrees of bunching around the twelfth and fourth order statistics,
any test will be sensitive to these restrictions. In trying to balance these trade-offs, we
start by assuming latent underlying borrowing costs follow a vector autoregressive pro-
cess.
ct = β0 +
∑
Γτct−τ + εt
Where εt ∼ N(0,Σ).The VAR specification is a reasonably flexible way to describe
time series relationships, however, there are two main restrictions embodied by this
assumption. First, we assume that, in the long run, bank borrowing costs are correlated
through similarities in the banks themselves. It is natural to think, for example, that U.S.
based banks should have positively correlated costs or that all banks with large retail
operations should be correlated. The crucial contrast here is that we rule out long run
relationships between a bank’s borrowing costs and the borrowing cost of the fourth,
or any other, rank bank. Second, is the assumptions that innovations are joint normally
distributed. While the parametric restriction is necessary given the high dimension of
the vector process, it is also undesirable. In the implementation of our tests, this is not
directly an issue since, as discussed below, we work with fitted quotes.
Under a null of truthful reporting we can estimate this process using observed quotes.
Due to cointegration and the high dimension of the vector process our preferred speci-
fication is a two lag, rank two, vector error correction model.
∆qt = Πqt +
∑
Λτ∆qt−τ + εt
With these estimates at hand we can examine how differences in the fitted or simulated
versus actual distribution of quotes support our theory of manipulation (as opposed to
simple misspecification of the cost process). Essentially, our testing strategy is to look
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for statistically and economically significant differences in the distribution of prediction
errors conditional on the position of pivotal quotes. Economically significant, here,
means consistent with our model, which predicts a particular form of bunching and
not others that might predict clustering of quotes together.9 Identification comes from
transitory changes in the relative bank ranks driven by actual idiosyncratic cost shocks
or changes in misreporting incentives. For example, suppose JP Morgan and Citigroup
are on average the fourth and fifth ranked banks and their quotes are highly correlated.
If neither bank faces idiosyncratic shocks that drive them up or down in relative rank
then, in the intraday distribution of quotes, both banks will be bunched at the fourth
highest. The fitted model would reflect this and the fitted and simulated quotes of the
two banks will also be bunched. If, on the other hand, occasional shocks shuffle JP
Morgan out of the fourth rank and Citigroup’s submissions continue to bunch with the
new occupant of the fourth spot, this will lead to bunching in the actual distribution but
not the fitted and simulated distributions.
It is important to note that, if manipulation is present, our model will be contaminated
even if our cost specification is correct. Thus, if the null of truthful reporting is false
our comparison distribution should be expected to, itself, bunch more around the pivotal
quotes than the actual cost distribution as in figure 1.3. How much more will depend on
the degree of contamination; how many and how often banks are manipulating. Even if
banks are constantly manipulating, however, the contaminated model will not display
the predicted discontinuity in the distribution at the pivotal quotes. For this reason, we
focus most of our attention on this discontinuity.
1.4.2 Results
Figure 1.4 (Figure 1.5) shows the pooled distribution of quotes of all banks normalized
by subtracting the fourth (12th) highest quote of the 15 other bank quotes over vari-
ous time periods. The bottom half of each panel show the fitted versions of the same
9Banks may cluster together if they all have incentives to simply not stick their “heads above
the parapet” as ordered by one Barclays executive in reference to the bank’s rate submission.
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normalized quotes.10 We use fitted quotes for our comparison distribution rather than
simulating innovations and adding them to the fitted quotes because we worry about
non-normality of the quotes. In particular, the large number of no-change observations
suggests that the fitted quotes may be a better choice. We have performed the same
analysis using simulated quotes as well and it only strengthens the results.
A couple of features of these figures stand out. First, to a striking degree the distri-
butions resemble the shape predicted by our model for both the upper and lower pivot
normalizations. Second, the distribution of normalized fitted quotes also displays a
good deal of bunching around the pivotal quotes, demonstrating the importance of de-
veloping our benchmark comparison distribution. To statistically verify this graphical
story we implement some simple statistical tests, motivated by the numerical experi-
ments with the model. Namely, we test for a discontinuity in the quote distribution at
the pivotal quote. A natural approach for such a discontinuity test is suggested by Mc-
Crary (2008). Unfortunately rounding of quotes combined with the small scale make
the required smoothing impossible so instead we simply compare the histogram bin
size of a small interval, [0, b) ((0, b]), above the quote minus the fourth (twelfth) highest
to the bin size of a small interval, [−b, 0) ((−b, 0]), below the quote minus the fourth
(twelfth) highest. Since 65% of quotes are rounded to the nearest basis point, an ad-
ditional 25% are rounded to the half basis point, and most of the rest are rounded to
the quarter basis point, our preferred window size is one basis point (b = .01) but we
report many of our results for the half (b = .005) and two (b = .02) basis point levels
as well.
Tables 1.3 show the results of our “Lower” bunching tests for all banks pooled together
at various window widths.11 The table confirms the graphical evidence. For almost
all periods and window widths each of our three bunching tests are significant at the
1% level for the lower pivot normalization. The only exception is in the final period
from October 2009 to January 2011 with 1bp window width. Here, the probability of a
10That is, for each bank, we subtract the fourth (12th) highest of the 15 other fitted quotes
from its own fitted quote.
11Bank level histograms are available on the authors’ website. “The Fix is In: Additional
Figures”
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normalized quote falling in the bin just below zero is almost identical for the fitted and
actual distributions. The prevalence of zero-change days, no doubt, contributes to an
overall similarity in the fitted (zero innovation vector) and actual quotes.
For the whole basis point windows, notably, the total mass in the windows around zero
are similar for the fitted and actual distributions. Examining the data a bit more closely
shows why this is the case. A huge fraction of quotes predicted to fall into the bin just
below (just above in the case of the upper pivotal quote normalization) zero, fall into
the just above (just below) bin. This demonstrates the mechanics of our tests using
the possibly contaminated estimates as a benchmark distribution. If the comparison
distribution were the actual distribution of costs we would expect to see quotes moving
from bins further above (below) the pivots to bins closer to the pivots. Our tests are
instead exploiting the change in the shape of the distributions at the pivotal quotes.
Table 3c-d delve into the tests with two way tables showing the joint distribution of
fitted and actual normalized quotes pooled over all banks and periods. In the analysis
of individual banks, almost all bank-periods that fail our test have this same pattern.
1.4.3 The Timing of Bunching and Collusion
Reports from ongoing Libor investigations and media coverage have indicated likely
collusion among panel banks in manipulating rates. The basic implications, in terms
of the shape of the intraday distribution of quotes, from our model are unchanged in
the presence of collusion. When banks collude, however, the scope for manipulation
is much greater and thus has serious implications for the magnitude of manipulation
and resultant welfare effects. When a bank acts unilaterally, their ability to distort the
rate down, relative to the rate that would prevail from honest reporting, is bounded by
1/8 times the difference between its true cost and its submission. At the other extreme,
five or more banks acting in concert move the rate as far as they desired, though in
a collusive equilibrium of our model they will not choose to do so due to the convex
misreporting costs. To explore collusion in light of our model we simply extend our
bunching tests to look at the correlation between banks of bunching behavior over time.
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We leave a fuller development of tests for collusion to future work.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the results of redoing our main bunching analysis using a
rolling window rather than pooling within discrete periods for 3M and 6M tenors for
the dollar Libor. Specifically we calculate kernel smoothed frequency of quotes falling
into either the 1bp above the pivot or 1bp below the pivot
Y a,4i,t =
T∑
τ=1
K( t−τ
h
)1{0 ≤ qit − s4 < b}
T∑
τ=1
K( t−τ
h
)
Y b,4i,t =
T∑
τ=1
K( t−τ
h
)1{−b ≤ qit − s4 < 0}
T∑
τ=1
K( t−τ
h
)
Where we use a simple, triangular kernel with 10 day bandwidth for K. We calcu-
late the corresponding smoothed measure for quotes normalized by the twelfth highest
quote and compare these with the fitted versions of the same.
There is no obviously strong pattern of correlation in bunching behavior in these mea-
sures between banks, though visually there appears to be a loose correlation in the
timing of bunching episodes across all banks. The graphs also support the general ob-
servation that bunching declines in the periods immediately following the failure of
Lehman Brothers and the depths of the financial crisis, incidentally the time when it is
most likely that reputation driven manipulation was occurring. This is especially true
of the upward manipulation tests.
The picture painted here generally corroborates the discussion above. While there ap-
pears to be some correlation across banks in their bunching behavior, the correlations
are as consistent with the existence of common underlying drivers of manipulation, as
in the example of future positions, as they are with an explicit conspiracy. Moreover,
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since different sets of banks appear to be pushing in opposite directions at the same time
and these sets don’t appear to be stable, the evidence is not suggestive of any specific
set of banks participating in a grand cartel. In general, the data appear consistent with
uncoordinated episodic manipulation, which may have involved occasional cooperation
among multiple banks.
1.5 Conclusion
Over the past 30 years most corners of financial markets have come to rely on Libor as
an essential gauge of the health of money markets and the direct and indirect implica-
tions thereof. Such heavy dependence has made the recent revelations of widespread
manipulation of these rates shocking to the point of crisis. Concerns about manipula-
tion were originally focused on the most tumultuous period of the financial crisis, when,
it was suggested, banks may have been understating their borrowing costs in order to
avoid negative market (over)reaction. While such a suggestion was disconcerting, mar-
ket observers could take solace in the fact that the problems with the rate were confined
to times when nothing seemed to be working properly and in the fact that misreporting
banks may have been doing a public service by helping avoid further panic. Recently,
however, investigations by regulators have uncovered evidence of manipulation driven
by bank trading positions with exposure to Libor.
In this paper we have developed tests for portfolio driven manipulation based on a
model of Libor panel bank survey submissions. The model predicts that the intraday
distribution of panel bank quotes will bunch around the fourth (twelfth) highest quote
in the presence of incentives to push the rate down (up). Our simple tests are designed
to deal with a couple of the most important empirical challenges presented by the sub-
missions data and alternative indicators of manipulation. Since we do not have a strong
prior on the form of the joint distribution of interbank borrowing costs, we develop a
flexible benchmark distribution with which to compare the actual quote distribution.
Our benchmark distribution is constructed by estimating a VAR model of bank quotes,
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which imposes that long run cost correlations are related to similarities between the
banks themselves but unrelated to the rank of any bank per se. We also take steps to
ensure our testing procedure is robust to the rounding and infrequent quote changes
found in the data.
Going to the data, we find strong evidence of the type of bunching predicted by our
model. Concerns about false negatives and false positives associated with our tests
notwithstanding, the bunching evidence is especially strong in the early periods of our
sample, with almost every bank individually failing our bunching tests at a very high
level of significance. Aspects of our findings are consistent with accounts of collusive
behavior, however, they are also consistent with common underlying sources of manip-
ulation incentives such as futures reset dates. Also, consistent with publicly available
accounts of manipulation, our evidence suggests that coordination between particular
banks was, if anything, on an episode by episode basis as opposed to a more centralized,
overarching conspiracy.
One limitation of our analysis is that it requires pooling of quotes over time, making
pinpointing specific, suspicious observations difficult. However, we are able to per-
form our tests at the bank level and at more coarse time breakdown enabling the tests
to inform a coherent narrative. Another limitation of our study is that we have not
done much to quantify the degree of manipulation. The best we can offer is evidence
from numerical simulations of our model. Viewed as back of the envelope calculations,
these results suggest test rejections at the level we observe, indicate frequent manip-
ulation and strong incentives with an average deviation of observed Libor rates from
actual rates over .5bp, which amounts to over a trillion dollars of contract mispricing
on aggregate.
Our analysis has several implications for the effective reform of Libor, several of which
have already been adopted by the Wheatly commission. One of these is the desirability
of putting more banks on the panel. As the number of banks increases, the influence
of any one bank on the overall rate diminishes and thus so do the incentives for misre-
porting. Our model also suggest increased regulatory oversight and audited submission
rules would also be desirable as these increase misreporting costs. The Wheatly Com-
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mission opted not to adopt the change, suggested by some, to make submissions anony-
mous instead embargoing quote data for 60 days after submission. Our results suggest
this is likely a sensible middle ground. Total anonymity might decrease misreporting
costs for panel banks. On the other hand, total visibility increases the likelihood of tacit
collusion.
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Table 1.1: Monte Carlo of Test on Model Simulated Data
Distribution of Bank 1 (Manipulator) Bank 16 (Non-Manipulator)
Incentives N=150 N=250 N = 500 N=150 N=250 N = 500
Uniform[-1/8,0]
mean p-value 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.49 0.53 0.51
5% significance 40% 45% 60% 16% 10% 11%
1% significance 27% 28% 46% 8% 5% 5%
Uniform[-1/24,0]
mean p-value 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.39 0.38 0.31
5% significance 42% 46% 60% 21% 22% 29%
1% significance 26% 29% 41% 11% 12% 15%
Uniform[-1/40,0]
mean p-value 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.43 0.42 0.37
5% significance 29% 34% 42% 20% 17% 23%
1% significance 17% 20% 27% 11% 8% 11%
Data simulated using various parametizations of the complete information static game
presented in the paper. Statistics calculated from 10,000 runs of N sample days of
simulated data. In each run 12 banks are manipulator banks which means they
occasionally have incentives (v ≥ 0) to manipulate.
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Table 1.2: Three Month Dollar Libor Summary Statistics
Mean St. Dev 25th Perc. 75th Perc.
All Periods (1,050 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote 0.0077 0.0946 -0.0100 0.0200
Daily Interquartile Range 0.0791 0.1332 0.0200 0.0900
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 4.3910 -3.4770 3.6420
Change in Quote from Prev. Day -0.0015 0.0349 0.0000 0.0050
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.4099 0.4918 0.0000 1.0000
1/2005-1/2007 (350 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote -0.0047 0.0282 -0.0050 0.0050
Daily Interquartile Range 0.0344 0.0372 0.0050 0.0650
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 4.3007 -3.5941 3.3175
Change in Quote from Prev. Day 0.0027 0.0093 0.0000 0.0100
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.4365 0.4960 0.0000 1.0000
8/2007-8/2008 (216 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote 0.0295 0.1486 -0.0200 0.0300
Daily Interquartile Range 0.1684 0.1933 0.0300 0.2100
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 4.4254 -3.8066 4.0219
Change in Quote from Prev. Day -0.0092 0.0479 -0.0200 0.0050
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.2354 0.4243 0.0000 0.0000
9/2008-1/2009 (84 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote 0.0786 0.3646 -0.0500 0.1800
Daily Interquartile Range 0.4804 0.3938 0.1300 0.8500
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 4.1394 -3.4299 3.2617
Change in Quote from Prev. Day -0.0116 0.1230 -0.0500 0.0100
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.2307 0.4214 0.0000 0.0000
2/2009-9/2009 (133 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote 0.0182 0.0683 -0.0200 0.0600
Daily Interquartile Range 0.1033 0.0500 0.0800 0.1100
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 3.3444 -2.0247 2.3929
Change in Quote from Prev. Day -0.0052 0.0193 -0.0100 0.0000
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.3710 0.4832 0.0000 1.0000
10/2009-1/2011 (267 trading days)
Diff. from Day’s Median Quote 0.0098 0.0391 -0.0100 0.0250
Daily Interquartile Range 0.0507 0.0246 0.0300 0.0650
Rank Diff. from Bank’s Avg. Rank 0.0000 2.6163 -1.5223 1.2997
Change in Quote from Prev. Day 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 0.0000
Fraction No Change from Prev. Day 0.6233 0.4846 0.0000 1.0000
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Table 1.3: All Bank Bunching at the 4th Lowest Quote (3M Dollar)
Window q − s4 All 1/2005- 8/2007- 9/2008- 2/2009- 10/2009-
Periods 7/2007 8/2008 1/2009 9/2009 1/2011
b = .005 Actual 0.029 0.042 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.036
Simulat. 0.067 0.106 0.046 0.022 0.040 0.059
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
b = .01 Actual 0.071 0.067 0.055 0.023 0.062 0.107
Simulat. 0.105 0.141 0.083 0.040 0.078 0.108
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.365
b = .015 Actual 0.089 0.089 0.078 0.032 0.073 0.126
Simulat. 0.133 0.159 0.113 0.051 0.107 0.152
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
b = .02 Actual 0.117 0.103 0.111 0.053 0.107 0.164
Simulat. 0.154 0.171 0.136 0.070 0.129 0.184
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
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Chapter 2
Impact and Consquences
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2.1 Introduction
Trader: [Would] be nice if you could put 0.90% for 1mth cheers.
Quote Submitter: Sure no prob. I’ll probably get a few phone calls but no
worries mate!
Trader: If you may get a few phone calls then put 0.88% then.
Quote Submitter: Don’t worry mate – there’s bigger crooks in the market
than us guys!
—Rabobank, internal discussion1
The Libor was recently subjected to one of the largest instances of market manipulation
in history. Hundreds of trillions of dollars worth of financial contracts were manipulated
by large banks, who have since been fined billions of dollars by regulators from four
countries.2 Investigations are ongoing and many class action lawsuits are underway due
to the huge volume of contracts adversely affected.3
The banks under investigation had simple incentives: they owned contracts whose pay-
outs were functions of the Libor. While recent regulatory investigations have revealed
that these portfolio incentives did in fact lead to manipulation, it is not known how
this affected the overall Libor rate. It is possible the Libor remained largely unchanged
throughout this episode, either due to an inability of banks to consistently execute ma-
nipulative intent, or thanks to varying portfolio incentives across banks. On the other
hand, manipulation may have caused a systemic distortion, which would undermine the
1From the Department of Justice’s investigation of Rabobank, see (DOJ (2013))
2Wheatley (2012) estimates $300 trillion worth of contracts directly reference the Libor
when determining interest rate payments. The regulatory bodies of the USA, UK, Switzer-
land, and the Netherlands have variously fined Barclays, UBS, the Royal Bank of Scotland and
Rabobank.
3The city of Baltimore, New Britain Firefighter’s and Police Benefit Fund, At-
lantic trading USA, and Community Bank&Trust are some of the representative mem-
bers of the four classes pursuing Libor related damages, according to Perkins Coie
(http://www.perkinscoie.com/libor faqs/). See Dodd (2010) for a description
of the losses incurred by municipalities.
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continued value of the Libor as a benchmark. Any persistent distortion may have af-
fected the allocation of funding in this period, as an estimated $10 trillion of syndicated
loans use the Libor as the variable interest rate (Wheatley (2012)).
In this paper, I quantify the degree to which manipulation distorted the Libor between
2005 and 2009. To do so, I estimate a strategic model where the Libor is formed each
day in a noncooperative game of incomplete information. The strategic interaction
between banks is generated by the aggregation mechanism of the Libor survey. Of
the sixteen quoted rates, only the middle eight quotes are used in the resulting average
which determines the benchmark. The four highest and lowest quotes are discarded.
This means, if a bank was a manipulator, it would need to forecast the quotes of its
peers in order to gauge its marginal ability to influence the overall Libor rate. Variation
in this marginal ability across banks and trading days allows me to recover each bank’s
average portfolio exposure to the Libor and, consequently, what they would have quoted
had they had no such exposure.4
I find that the Libor was largely accurate prior to the financial crisis starting in late 2007,
but was since distorted downwards by eight basis points. This is substantial given the
volume of contracts affected and that manipulators routinely made large gains from
single basis point changes.5 I calculate that U.S municipalities, which held $500 billion
worth of interest rate swaps in 2010, would have lost $455 million from this eight basis
point shift over my sample period.6
4There are many other benchmark interest rates similar to the Libor, including the Tokyo-
based Tibor, the Mumbai-based Mibor, the many Euribor, and others. Since these are also
typically calculated using truncated averages, the strategy I employ in this paper could be used
to study the manipulation of these benchmarks as well.
5This is a common theme in the regulatory investigations. See for example FCA (2012a):
“Barclays’ Derivatives Traders knew on any particular day what their books’ exposure to a one
basis point (0.01%) movement in Libor or Euribor was.” A Barclays trader said to the quote
submitter, “We have about 80 [billion] fixing for the desk and each [basis point] lower in the
fix is a huge help for us.” (Ibid.) See also FCA (2012b) and Snider and Youle (2012) for more
examples.
6See Preston (2012) and Dodd (2010) for background on municipal ownership of interest-
rate swaps.
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The transition between an accurate pre-crisis Libor and a distorted post-crisis Libor was
driven by sharp changes in volatility and heterogeneity across banks. Prior to the finan-
cial crisis, banks had very similar risk characteristics and typically submitted identical
or near-identical quotes to the survey. If the other fifteen banks are all submitting the
same, correct rate, what could a potential manipulator achieve by submitting something
different? Once the crisis began, however, banks’ faced newly heterogeneous risks and
submitted a broader range of quotes to the survey. This generated a larger interquartile
range between the fifth and twelfth highest submissions which gave potential manipu-
lators room in which to work.
With these results in mind, I compare the performance of counterfactual Libor aggre-
gation mechanisms in the presence of active manipulators. This contribution is partic-
ularly timely as regulators are currently considering how best to reform to the Libor to
safeguard it against future manipulation.7 In particular, the Financial Conduct Author-
ity (FCA) is considering increasing the size of the Libor panel, anonymizing quotes
for three months, and tying quotes to underlying transactions as much as possible.8
While the FCA also considered changing the current mechanism used to calculate the
Libor from the underlying quotes, they concluded this would not improve the Libor’s
accuracy.
I find, on the contrary, that changing the current mechanism for calculating the Libor
can make it considerably less vulnerable to manipulation. In particular, changing the
Libor to use the median quote removes virtually all of its systematic downwards bias in
the sample period I examine. My results differ from those of the FCA analysis because
they assume submitted quotes would not change even if the method used to calculate the
Libor were changed. This runs contrary to the idea that manipulators take into account
the aggregation mechanism when they strategically submit their quotes. Documents
revealed by the investigations show manipulators had a very keen awareness of the
exact mechanism.9 In my counterfactual analysis, manipulators are perfectly aware of
7The Libor and other benchmarks are becoming regulated for the first time.
8See Wheatley (2012) for a comprehensive review of the FCA proposals.
9See, for example, FCA (2012a)
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the aggregation mechanism when they submit their quotes.
The counterfactual performance of the median is driven by the difficultly for manip-
ulators to accurately forecast the location of the median on any given day. Even if a
manipulator were able to correctly guess the median, they would not be able to skew
their quote very far before they were no longer the median submission. In essence,
using the median is similar to narrowing the interquartile range. There could also be
a feedback effect. If the median mechanism causes most other banks to skew less,
manipulators may skew less as they update their median forecasts.
For some values of the model parameters, however, the median can actually perform
worse. The is because the distribution of private information plays an important role in
my model’s equilibrium. The performance of the median, relative to the interquartile
range, depends on this distribution as well as the incentives for banks to manipulate.
In particular, under certain conditions, a manipulator may be more or less certain they
will be the median quote. In this case, the median mechanism would give them much
greater power in determining the final rate, which lead the manipulator to skew more
than they would otherwise.10 This ambiguity is why I must bring the model to the data.
I model banks in the Libor panel as playing a noncooperative game of incomplete in-
formation. Each bank has a true interbank borrowing cost which depends on publicly
observed covariates, as well as an idiosyncratic shock which is private information.
Each bank is therefore uncertain of the quotes of the other banks when submitting its
own quote. Manipulators are concerned with the quotes of the others because they want
to forecast the interquartile range within which they can affect the Libor. Banks that
aren’t manipulators, however, are not concerned with forecasting the quotes of their
peers.
My game is estimated in two steps. First, I nonparametrically estimate each bank’s
marginal impact on the expected Libor. This marginal impact is an equilibrium object
10Diehl (2013) shows the relative performance of the median-quote Libor is ambiguous in a
complete information version of the game introduced in Snider and Youle (2012). This ambi-
guity persists in my current, incomplete information game.
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which depends upon the strategies being played by the other banks. In the second step,
I form moments from the model’s first order conditions and use the submitted quotes
and the results from the first step to estimate the game’s parameters, which include
banks’ incentives to manipulate. From this, I construct a “manipulation free” Libor by
calculating what banks would have quoted had they had no such incentives.
It is important to note that portfolio exposure to the Libor was not the only reason banks
submitted misleading quotes. The other reason was reputational. Each bank’s quote is
publicly revealed after the Libor is computed. Whenever a bank submits a relatively
high quote, thereby admitting to a high cost of borrowing funds from its peers, other
market participants might infer something is amiss with that bank. In the run-prone
environment of the recent financial crisis, it is unsurprising that banks wished to avoid
this negative attention. Indeed, regulators have uncovered many documents expressing
banks’ desires to avoid being seen as lacking creditworthiness.11
I do not attempt to meaningfully capture these reputational incentives for banks to sub-
mit misleading quotes. Instead, I control for them with a flexible specification of fixed
effects. I use bank-quarter effects and use the within-bank, within-quarter variation in
marginal impacts upon the Libor to identify my model. Reputational effects are im-
plicitly incorporated into my counterfactual analysis and the manipulation-free quotes I
produce. I do not recover the “correct” Libor, only a Libor free of portfolio-driven ma-
nipulation.12 These reputational incentives to misreport will be reduced by the FCA’s
new policy of anonymizing individual quotes fir three months. This anonymity, how-
ever, will exacerbate banks’ portfolio-driven incentives to misreport by reducing the
ability of other market participants to examine and monitor the submitted quotes.
Snider and Youle (2012) use a similar model to motivate a test for Libor manipulation.
My approach differs from theirs by assuming banks play a game of incomplete infor-
mation. This relatively minor modeling difference leads to a completely different em-
pirical strategy. Incomplete information creates smoothness in banks’ profit functions
and allows the derivation of a system of necessary first order conditions. Estimating
11Ibid.
12These reputational incentives likely would have pushed the Libor downwards even further.
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these first order conditions lets me measure the size of banks’ long term average ex-
posures to the Libor. Knowing this size allows me quantify the extent of the Libor’s
distortion and examine the accuracy of counterfactual aggregation mechanisms. I am
unable, however, to capture manipulation that occurs at a high frequency, which was
an important part of the Libor’s recent manipulation, and for which Snider and Youle
(2012)’s test is better suited to detect.
This paper is related to the recent literature on estimating games that occur in financial
markets. Cassola et al. (2013) measures banks’ demand for funding through a structural
auction model of the EONIA funds service. They use observed bids and the structure
of the auction to recover banks’ valuations. In my model, I use observed quotes and
the structure of the Libor mechanism to recover banks’ portfolio exposures. Guerre
et al. (2009) use an exclusion restriction in an auction setting to separately identify bid-
ders’ risk aversion from their distribution of valuations. I also employ an exclusion re-
striction to separately identify manipulators’ portfolio exposures from their unobserved
interbank shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the history of the
Libor and the recent manipulation scandal. Section 3 describes my data. Section 4
introduces the strategic model of manipulation. Section 5 describes my estimation pro-
cedure and results. Section 6 discusses my results. Section 7 introduces an algorithm to
compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium and compares counterfactual Libor mechanisms.
Section 8 concludes.
2.2 History of the Libor
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is a benchmark interest rate that has grown
to become a central institution in financial markets.13 An estimated $300 trillion of
13The Libor is quoted in many different maturities and currencies. In this paper I focus on
the three month dollar Libor which, along with the six month Libor, is most commonly used by
financial contracts.
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contracts use the Libor to determine their obligated interest payments. Many syndicated
loans, adjustable rate mortgages, student loans, and other financial products routinely
depend upon the Libor in this fashion. An even larger array of interest rate derivatives,
such as forwards, futures, and swaps, depend directly upon the Libor.
The Libor is calculated by a daily survey managed by the British Banker’s Association
(BBA).14 A fixed panel of sixteen large banks are asked,
“At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and
then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to
eleven a.m. London time?”
The four lowest and four highest rate quotes are then discarded, with the average of the
remaining middle eight quotes forming the day’s Libor. I assume in what follows that,
for each bank there is a more or less correct answer to this question, and that they are
aware of it. These banks are in constant communication with brokers and one another,
making this an easy question for them to resolve.
The modern Libor was established in the 1980s to provide a standardized interest rate
benchmark. The growth of the Libor’s general use was facilitated by the growth of
trading in interest rate derivatives. The Libor was adopted early on in the markets for
interest rate derivatives and experienced lock-in due to network effects. It is easier to
write and trade contracts using a well established as opposedto obscure benchmarks.
Accordingly, the Libor had the distinct advantage of being introduced in the 1980s,
well before current rival benchmarks defined using more recent money market interest
rates, such as the going rate for repurchase agreements.
While an enormous number of contracts reference the Libor, the London interbank
market, for which the Libor is supposed to represent the average price of funds, is small.
This market was large in the 1980s, but has been largely been replaced by overnight and
14In the period I examine, the BBA was in charge of overseeing the Libor and monitoring
submission accuracy. The BBA is an industry group composed largely of the banks sitting on
the Libor panel. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has since required the BBA transfer
the governance of the Libor to another private institution.
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collateralized forms of lending. Repurchase agreements, commercial paper, overnight
federal funds, and other close money market substitutes are now the primary vehicles
through which banks and other financial institutions exchange funds. This has made it
increasingly difficult to verify submitted Libor quotes to actual interbank trades as such
trades are increasingly uncommon.
Despite the recent manipulation, the Libor is still widely used, and will remain largely
unchanged in the medium term. The FCA ultimately decided to reform the Libor rather
than replace it with another measure. Such a switch could trigger a wave of lawsuits
and costly renegotiation of legacy Libor-referencing contracts, and is opposed by the
vast majority of Libor stakeholders (Wheatley (2012)). In the long run, however, it
is entirely possible that the market will move towards a new benchmark that is less
vulnerable to manipulation. In the short run, regulators and market participants are
eager to restore the Libor’s credibility as a benchmark interest rate.
2.3 Data
I collect the daily Libor quotes for each of the panel banks from a Bloomberg Terminal.
I focus on the period beginning October 4th, 2005 and ending October 28th, 2009 for
a total of 1,009 trading days. This period includes the movement in the Libor from its
high level prior to the onset of the financial crisis in the second quarter of 2007, to its
low level in the third quarter of 2009. It also contains some of the most volatile periods
of the financial crisis as well as vocal concerns over Libor manipulation in the media.
Table 2.1 shows the raw quote data for the sixteen panel banks for the week beginning
on Monday, December 12th, 2007. Several features are worthy of note. First, the
Libor is calculated using the middle eight quotes; the four highest and lowest quotes
are discarded. Second, banks typically quote close together. Third, banks’ quotes are
persistant; banks do not typically quote far from their previous values. The within and
between bank quote variance, however, alters dramatically over my sample period, as
the market moves from calm to stressful periods.
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The interquartile range of quotes varies considerably over my sample as shown in fig-
ure 2.1. Before the crisis, banks submitted quotes very close to one another.15 Once
the crisis began, however, banks began to change their quotes considerably from day
to day, and quotes become different from bank to bank. A clear example of the dif-
ference in pre- and post-crisis behavior can be seen in table 2.2. On January 2, 2007,
fifteen of the sixteen banks submitted identical quotes and the interquartile range was
zero. On October 21, 2008, the sixteen banks submitted eleven unique quotes and the
interquartile range was fifteen basis points.
In figure 2.2, I show the submitted Libor quotes relative to the day’s average, overlaid
with the banks’ CDS quotes, a measure of their credit risk, relative to the day’s aver-
age. Prior to the crisis, there was very little difference between banks in both the CDS
spreads and the quotes they submitted to the survey. Once the crisis began, however,
there was substantial across-bank heterogeneity both in their CDS spreads and their
attendant quotes.
The Libor is one of many money market rates which govern short-to-medium-term
lending between financial institutions. Other money market rates include certificate
of deposit rates, repurchase agreement rates, and commercial paper rates. These rates
are generally close substitutes and typically co-move with each other and the Libor.
Including these variables allows me to control for the secular change in interest rates
that occurs in response to monetary policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve. To
that end, I use data from the H.15 interest rate series on market rates for commercial
paper. I also collect daily data on the federal funds effective rate, which is the overnight
analogue of the interbank market.16
Table 2.3 shows the frequencies that each bank is either below, inside, or above the
day’s interquartile mean of quotes. There are systematic differences between banks,
15This tight clustering of quotes was noted early on in the suspicion of the Libor by Abrantes-
Metz et al. (2012).
16There are differences in the banking holidays between London and New York. Conse-
quently, the federal funds effective rate is not always computed every day the Libor is computed,
and vice versa. This generates missing values in my data. Whenever a value is unobserved in
this fashion, I impute the price to be the last quoted price.
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but no bank is either always within or always outside the middle eight. Some banks,
however, spend far more time on one side of the quartile than the other. For example,
52.8% of Norinchukin’s quotes were above the interquartile range while only 0.7%
were below. This is important for the identification of my model, which is discussed
further in section five.
2.4 Model of Strategic Manipulation
I model the Libor panel as a noncooperative game of incomplete information played by
the banks in the survey. Banks on the panel consist of a true interbank borrowing cost,
which depends on publically observed covariates, and a private idiosyncratic shock.
Banks submit quotes simultaneously and are uncertain of the other banks’ quotes due
to the others’ private information. Manipulators, therefore, seek to forecast the in-
terquartile range within which they can impact the Libor.
Banks are not necessarily cooperative nor antagonistic. Their attitude towards their
peers depends upon their private information and their incentives to manipulate the Li-
bor. In particular, I allow banks to prefer a high Libor, a low Libor, or to be indifferent.
Given the flexibility of interest rate derivatives and the secrecy of banks’ net exposures,
it is a priori as likely that banks would “short” the Libor as the opposite.
2.4.1 Setup
Let i = 1, ..., 16 index the sixteen banks on the Libor panel. Let t = 1, ..., T index
the trading days in my sample. A bank’s observed covariates are denoted xit, with
xt = (x1t, x2t, ..., x16t). A bank’s submitted quote is qit, with qt = (q1t, ...., q16t). The
day’s Libor is the interquartile mean of the quotes, given by:
L(qt) =
1
8
16∑
i=1
1
{
qit ∈ IQR(qt)
}
qit
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where IQR(qt) is the interquartile range of the submitted quotes qt.17
Banks play a static game of incomplete information. They each receive a private, in-
dependent, and idiosyncratic cost shock it. These covariates include general market
information, in the form of prices in related substitute money markets, and include bank
specific information, in the form of credit risk measured by the price of default insur-
ance.18 The residual it is the unobserved component of interbank borrowing costs,
cit = xitβi + it (2.1)
Each bank’s unobserved borrowing cost it is distributed according to Fit|xt . While I
assume that the cost shock is mean independent of the unobservables, i.e. that E[it|xt] =
0, the distribution of the cost shock can depend upon the observables xt in its higher
moments. This allows costs to be heteroskedastic, which is important given the time-
varying volatility evident in my data. The interbank borrowing costs themselves re-
main correlated through their dependence upon the correlated observable variables
(x1t, x2t, ..., x16t). Since banks are entangled in the same system of supply and demand
of interbank loans and typically share similar risk characteristics, correlated costs are
likely.
Banks have strategic incentives to manipulate the Libor stemming from their portfolios.
They also don’t want to be seen as manipulating it. I model their payoff function as
being additive in these two incentives. Bank i’s realized profits, given its characteristics
and the quotes of the others, is given by:
pii(qit, q−it, xit, it) = vi(xit)L(qit, q−it)− δ(qit − xitβi − it)2 + ψiqit (2.2)
The term vi(xit) represents bank i’s portfolio exposure to the Libor, which can depend
17Note that while Libor is increasing and Lipschitz continuous, it is neither continuously
differentiable, supermodular, nor concave. Thus the first order conditions are not sufficient for
optimality without further assumptions.
18I use daily one year senior CDS spreads at the bank level as the bank-specific credit risk
measure.
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upon its characteristics.19 The scalar δ represents the bank’s concern over the conse-
quences of misreporting their true interbank borrowing costs. This is because banks
are monitored by regulators, other banks, and market participants. They also face the
possibility of being probed by regulators who then levy steep fines upon them for ma-
nipulation. I do not attempt to model this underlying monitoring. Instead I use a simple
quadratic functional form to approximate banks desire to quote near their costs, a desire
that was routinely expressed in documents uncovered by investigators.
The term ψi captures bank’s reputational concerns over their quotes. This stems from
the fact that banks’ quotes are publicly revealed later in the day. If a bank were to
submit a relatively high rate quote it might signal to other market participants that it is
not as creditworthy as its peers. This reputational concern might differ across banks and
across market conditions. Thus I allow ψi to change from quarter to quarter, treating it
as a bank-quarter fixed effect in estimation.
The long-run average portfolio exposures v = (v1, v2, ..., v16) are assumed to be com-
mon knowledge. The observed covariates xt and the parameters (δ, β1, ..., β16, ψ1, ..., ψ16)
are also common knowledge. Finally, the distributions of the unobserved shocks F are
also common knowledge. Each bank knows these variables and parameters as well
as their own private cost shock it. The only variables bank i is uncertain of when
submitting its quotes are the indiosyncratic cost shocks −it of the other fifteen banks.
I assume that banks play pure strategies.20 Bank i’s strategy at t, denoted φit, maps
its information (xt, it) into its quote qit such that φit(xt, it) = qit. A bank’s expected
19I can’t recover each bank’s exposure to the Libor at a daily frequency. In principle, there is
nothing stopping a trader from setting up a position one day and then rewinding it and setting
up the opposite position the next. The test by Snider and Youle (2012) is better suited to detect
manipulation driven by such behavior. Since I am trying to recover longer term incentives to
skew the Libor, I aim to capture each bank’s average exposure to the Libor over my sample
period.
20The Single Crossing Condition as defined in Athey (2001) is satisfied and therefore a mono-
tone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
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profit, when the other banks are playing φ−it, is given by,
Πi(qit, xt, it;φ−it) =
∫
−it
pii(qit, φ−it(xt, −it), xit, it)dF−it|xt (2.3)
Banks are assumed to be playing a pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Definition: A (pure strategy) Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium is a vector of strategies φt
such that, for every bank i and information set (xt, it),
φit(xt, it) ∈ argmaxqΠi(q, xt, it;φ−it)
For what follows, it is convenient to define an expected Libor (given φ−it):
Li(qit, xt;φ−it) ≡
∫
−it
L(qit, φ−it(xt, −it))dF−it|xt (2.4)
Banks are only concerned with forecasting the quotes of their peers insofar as they alter
the expected Libor. This allows me to rewrite the expected profit equation (2.3) as,
Πi(qit, xt, it;φ−it) = vi(xit)Li(qit, xt;φ−it)− δ(qit − xitβi − it)2 + ψiqit (2.5)
Taking the first order condition and rearranging,
qit =
vi(xit)
2δ
∂
∂qit
Li(qit, xt;φ−it) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβ + it (2.6)
This equation has an intuitive interpretation. Banks quote their costs with a skew term
similar to bidders in an auction model.21 The degree to which they skew is proportional
to the ratio of their manipulation (vi(xit)) and truth telling (δ) incentives, as well as
their marginal impact on the expected Libor. They also skew proportional to their
reputational incentives (ψi).
21For examples, see Krishna (2009)
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2.4.2 Multiplicity
My model admits multiple equilibria.22 This stems from the kinks in the Libor function
L which allows banks to coordinate on the aggressiveness of their skewing. Consider
a case where banks have identical incentives. If the other banks skew aggressively in
bank A’s favored direction, bank A also has a wider latitude to skew and will do so.
If they don’t skew aggressively, bank A is more likely to be excluded from the middle
eight by skewing aggressively and will skew less. If the cost distribution has finite
support, one can prove the existence of multiple equilibria constructively.
These equilibria, however, are bounded within a set range. This is because the deriva-
tive of the expected Libor is always bounded between zero and one eighth, irrespective
of the strategies being played by the other banks. This then implies the best responses
are bounded as a consequence of the first order condition, as shown in equation 2.6.
Intuitively, these bounds come from two facts. First, no manipulator would ever skew
the Libor in a direction opposite of their incentives. Second, no manipulator would ever
skew the Libor more than it would if only its quote were used to compute the Libor. I
use these bounds when confronting this multiplicity in my counterfactual analysis.
This multiplicity, however, poses no problem for my ability to estimate the model, so
long as the equilibrium selection mechanism depends only on the observables. This is
because an analogue of the first order condition, which averages across the equilibria
and is in terms of objects observable to the econometrician (up to the parameters), is a
logical implication of the model. I pursue this idea in the remainder of this section.
Suppose for a given xt there is a finite number e = 1, ..., E of equilibria. The econome-
trician does not know which equilibrium e is being played on any given day. Let Λe(xt)
be the probability equilibrium e occurs according to some underlying and unknown
selection mechanism. Let φet be the strategy profile corresponding to equilibrium e.
The econometrician does not observe Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) directly, but only the following
weighted average across equilibria,
22In the complete information version of my model, studied in Snider and Youle (2012) and
Diehl (2013), there is also a considerable multiplicity of equilibria.
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Lit(qit, xt) ≡
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) (2.7)
Similarly, the econometrician does not observe
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) directly, but only
the following weighted average across the equilibria,
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) = ∂
∂qit
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) =
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt;φe−it)
(2.8)
Finally, the econometrician does not observe quotes conditional on an equilibrium e but
only the unconditional quotes,
E[qit|xt] =
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∫
it
φeit(xt, it)dFit (2.9)
However, because both the first order conditions and differentation are linear, a version
of the first order condition is implied by the model,
E[qit|xt] =
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∫
it
φeit(xt, it)dFit (2.10)
=
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∫
it
(
vi(xt)
2δ
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) +
ψi
2δ
+ xitβi + it
)
dF (it) (2.11)
=
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
(
vi(xt)
2δ
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) +
ψi
2δ
+ xitβi
)
(2.12)
=
vi(xt)
2δ
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∂
∂q
Lit(qit, xt;φe−it) +
ψi
2δ
+ xitβi (2.13)
=
vi(xt)
2δ
∂
∂qit
Li(qit, xt) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβi (2.14)
Where the equation (2.12) used the first order condition equation (2.6), and equation
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(2.14) used equation (2.8). The model then implies the following relationship,
E[qit|xt] = vi(xt)
2δ
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβi (2.15)
Which is in terms of objects that are observable (up to the parameters) by the econo-
metrician, and only requires the assumption that the selection mechanism Λ depends
only on the observables xt. This assumption is also used in De Paula and Tang (2012)
who develop a formal test for multiple equilibria in entry games. It also means that
I need not assume the same equilibrium is being played across different trading days.
Relaxing this assumption, which is common in the structural estimation of games, is
possible due to the linearity of my first order conditions and the fact that they hold in
every equilibrium.
Things are greatly aided by the fact that the Libor-setting game satisfies Milgrom and
Shannon (
2.5 Estimation
The challenge posed by the possibility of multiple equilbria drives my empirical strat-
egy. A common technique for estimating non-cooperative games involves the explicit
computation of equilibria while searching over the parameter space to minimize an em-
pirical criterion function.23 Applying that technique in this setting would require me
to make strong assumptions about the form of the equilibrium selection function Λ, as
well as the functional form of the distribution of the unobservables Fit|xt .
24 Searching
over the parameter space is computationally expensive and would require either simu-
lation methods or the construction of a likelihood function – both complicated by the
presence of multiple equilibria.
23Many papers use variations of this approach. For an example, see Seim (2006) who circum-
vents the multiplicity problem by showing the existence of a unique equilibrium under certain
conditions.
24An alternative is to use a bounds approach as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
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To avoid these issues, I implement a two-step estimator.25 In the first step, I non-
parametrically estimate the equilibrium derivative of the expected Libor L with respect
to a bank’s quote. I use local linear kernel regression, using the Libor fixes, quotes,
and observables from the data. In the second step, I estimate the banks’ necessary first
order conditions. Specifically, I estimate equation 2.6 using this estimated derivative as
a covariate. This allows me to recover each bank’s long run average exposure to the
Libor vi(xit) as a parameter and its interbank shock it as a residual.26
In the second stage, I use exclusion restrictions to generate additional moment con-
ditions which are necessary to pin down the parameters of my model. This indirect,
revealed preference approach is necessary as banks carefully guard the secrecy of their
portfolio exposures to the Libor. However, as a robustness check, I compare the results
of my estimates with the information on bank portfolio positions revealed in the Call
Reports.
2.5.1 Nonparametric First Step
The first step in my estimation procedure is to nonparametrically estimate the derivative
of the expected Libor
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt). I do this by using the definition of a derivative
and nonparametrically estimating the expected Libor itself at two nearby points.
The procedure begins by considering how the realized Libor L would have changed
had a given bank i submitted a slightly higher quote. I compute,
L∆it ≡ L(qit + ∆, q−it) (2.16)
for each bank i and day t. This measures the resulting Libor had bank i quoted qit + ∆
25My estimator is loosely inspired by Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes et al. (2007), Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Unlike these approaches, I
do not need to assume the same equilibrium is being played across the data – only that the
equilibrium selection mechanism is reasonably well behaved.
26As the first step is nonparametric and our second parametric, this procedure is a semipara-
metric regression as discussed in Robinson (1988)
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instead of qit. Note that I could use these calculations to compute the realized derivative
for each bank as (L∆it − Lt)/∆. For a ∆ small enough, this realized derivative will
always be zero or one eighth. Either qit + ∆ is included in the interquartile range
or it isn’t. This is what would be relevant if banks are playing a game of complete
information.
However, banks are not perfectly aware of where the pivotal cutoff points of the in-
terquartile range will be located. This is because they are uncertain about the shocks
−it, and hence the resulting quotes, of their peers. This creates a smooth range over
where their marginal impact on the expected Libor can lie. This marginal impact re-
mains bounded between zero and one eighth, but can also lie somewhere in between.
Recall that,
Lit(qit, xt) =
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∫
−it
L(qit, φ
e
−it(xt, −it))dF−it|xt = E
[
Lt|qit, xit
]
(2.17)
where Lt is the realization of the day’s Libor, which depends upon the underlying
equilibrium, quotes, and cost shocks. Recovering E[Lt|qit, xt], however, involves no
more than estimating a conditional expectation, as I observe (Lt, qit, xt) directly in the
data. Similarly, by computing L∆it as above, using the mechanical rule for the Libor
mechanism and the observed quotes, I have the following,
Lit(qit + ∆, xt) =
E∑
e=1
Λe(xt)
∫
−it
L(qit + ∆, φ
e
−it(xt, −it))dF−it|xt = E
[
L∆it |qit, xit
]
(2.18)
and again, as (L∆it , qit, xt) are all observed, recovering E
[
L∆it |qit, xit
]
involves nothing
more than estimating a conditional expectation.
I estimate both E
[
Lt|qit, xit
]
and E
[
L∆it |qit, xit
]
nonparametrically, using local linear
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regression.27 This is a kernel regression – essentially a locally weighted average of the
Libors, where the observables (qit, xt) are used to define what “local” is.
Given estimates of Ê
[
Lt|qit, xit
]
and Ê
[
L∆it |qit, xit
]
, I estimate the derivative of the
expected Libor. First I use the definition of a derivative,
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) = lim
∆→0
Lit(qit + ∆, xt)− Lit(qit, xt)
∆
The empirical analogue I use for estimation is then,
∂̂
∂qit
L
it
(qit, xt) =
L̂it(qit + ∆, xt)− L̂it(qit, xt)
∆
=
Ê
[
L∆it |qit, xit
]− Ê[Lt|qit, xit]
∆
I estimate this partial derivative for a fixed ∆, stipulating that ∆ → 0 as T → ∞ but
that ∆T → ∞ for consistency. In practice, I set the value for ∆ to be a quarter of a
basis point.28
2.5.2 Parametric Second Step
In the second step I estimate the first order conditions (2.15) using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM), plugging in the derivative recovered in the first step .
Plugging in our first stage estimates into equation (2.15) produces the following esti-
mating equation:
E
[
qit − vi(xt)
2δ
∂̂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβi | xt
]
= 0 (2.19)
27For background on local linear regression and its properties, see Fan and Gijbels (1996).
28Banks submit quotes in smaller increments very rarely. While this may suggest a discrete
choice modeling approach, a discretization that would surround all the quotes banks actually
submit around the day’s Libor, up to quarter basis point increments, would involve over a hun-
dred bins. Given there are sixteen banks, this means an action space of at least one hundred to
the sixteenth power, which generates matrices far beyond my ability to invert.
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where I have implicitly assumed that the measurement error in the first step is mean
independent of xt.29
From the structure of equation (2.19) we might be content that the model is identi-
fied. However, the situation is more pessimistic for a similar environment examined by
Guerre et al. (2009), who examine a first price auction where bidders have an unknown
(to the econometrician) distribution of valuations for a good, as well as an unknown
(again, to the econometrician) risk aversion parameter. This is largely analogous to my
environment, where I have an unknown distribution of interbank borrowing shocks and
an unknown portfolio exposure parameter. They find that, without further assumptions,
their model is nonidentified.
This makes it likely that the identification coming from equation (2.19) is primarily
due to my parametric assumptions when specifying bank profits. A more general mis-
reporting cost function, rather than my current quadratic form, will likely make the
model nonidentified per Guerre et al. (2009). As I view my quadratic form as a first
approximation to some potentially more complex, unknown, form, I pursue the solu-
tion of Guerre et al. (2009), which is to use an exclusion restriction. In particular,
they assume that the number of bidders in the auction is unrelated to the distribution
of bidder valuations. Seeing how observed quotes vary as the number of competitors
varies is what enables them to separately identify the risk aversion parameters from the
distribution of valuations.
I invoke a related exclusion restriction. However, as I always have the same number
of banks in my sample, I use a different set of variables which are unrelated to banks
current, unobserved borrowing shocks. I use lagged quotes of the other banks as such
a variable, because they are useful for forecasting their current quotes. The logic is
that, from a manipulator’s point of view, it is not directly concerned with the lagged
quotes of its peers, but they do help it predict what the others will quote today and,
hence, what its marginal impact on the Libor will be. Specifically, I use the lagged
interquartile range of the quotes as an excluded variable,
29It is possible that first step measurement error leads to bias in the second step, a regular
concern when using two-step estimators to structurally estimate games.
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E[it|IQRt−1] = 0 (2.20)
which I use to form the following unconditional moment conditions for each bank:
E
[
xit
(
qit − vi(xt)
2δ
∂̂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβi
)]
= 0
E
[
IQRt−1
(
qit − vi(xt)
2δ
∂̂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) + ψi
2δ
+ xitβi
)]
= 0
I use GMM with these moment conditions where ψi is treated as a bank-quarter fixed
effect to estimate my parameters.
As my specification of bank profits is homogeneous of degree one in (vi(xi), δ, ψi),
it is only identified up to scale. This is typical when studying revealed preferences,
where it is standard to normalize a utility or cost parameter, or the utility from receiving
an outside option. While I can’t interpret my parameters in terms of dollars, I can
use them predict bank behavior, which is what I need to measure the performance of
counterfactual Libor mechanisms.
To see how I identify bank’s incentives to manipulate, consider a different world where
the Libor was not calculated by an interquartile mean, but instead was a simple average.
In that case,
∂
∂qit
Lit(qit, xt) would always be one sixteenth for every i, t, and (qit, xt).
In this case it would be impossible to recover the average portfolio exposure of a bank
to the Libor. The derivative would be collinear with the reputational fixed effect ψi. It
is only by seeing how a bank’s incentives to skew the Libor evolves over time, as they
move in and out of the middle eight of the quotes of the other banks, we see variation
in their marginal ability to influence the Libor.
The primary assumptions I use to identify my model are (i) the specification of bank
profits, (ii) the mean independence of the unobservable cost shock from the observ-
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ables and (iii) the mean independence of the unobservable cost shock from the lagged
interquartile range. Mean independence is weaker than assuming full independence,
which would not be appropriate setting given the considerable time-varying heteroskedas-
ticity evident in the data. In this sense, my approach shares a similar feature with the
econometric models of time-varying volatility, such as multivariate GARCH models,
which are commonly used to model interest rates and other financial variables.30
2.6 Results
I present the results of the first step of my estimation procedure in a series of figures.
Figure 2.3 shows the marginal impact of all possible quotes for the Bank of Tokyo Mit-
subishi on two separate trading days. The blue line corresponds to the realized deriva-
tive (L∆it−Lt)/∆, which would obtain if the Bank of Tokyo knew exactly what the day’s
interquartile range would be.31 The red line is the estimated derivative
∂̂
∂qit
L
it
(qit, xt)
resulting from my specification of incomplete information. Uncertainty about the pri-
vate information, and hence the quotes, of a banks’ peers smooths out the distribution
of its marginal influence on the expected Libor through its uncertainty over the exact
location of the pivotal points.
In figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 I present the first stage estimates for three banks along with
the relative locations of their quotes compared to the interquartile range of the quotes
submitted by their peers. These three figures show the marginal impacts for the quotes
banks chose to submit. I also show the marginal impacts for all of the possible quotes
a bank could have chosen to submit through time in figure 2.8. Here we can see the
tight and short distribution of marginal impacts before the financial crisis, which then
grows in breadth and height as the crisis progresses, and then spikes around the default
of Lehman brothers. The marginal impacts shown in figure 2.3 are time slices of this
30See Bauwens et al. (2006) for a survey of these influential time series models.
31This corresponds to the assumption in Snider and Youle (2012), and generates a “bunching”
prediction they use to develop a test for strategic manipulation.
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contour map for two different days.
The second stage parameter estimates are shown in table 2.4. Most of the banks wish
to push the Libor downwards, but not all. Thus the Libor is the result of a “tug of
war” in which some banks wish to skew it upwards, and others wish to skew it down-
wards. Given banks’ radically different locations, primary currencies of operation, and
business models, this may be expected. The winning side ultimately depends upon the
distribution of bank borrowing costs.
I am unable to estimate the first order conditions for the Bank of Tokyo, Societe Gen-
erale, HBOS, Norinchukin and WestLB because they do not have CDS spreads for
enough of the trading days over the period I consider. In my counterfactual analysis I
assume they are truth tellers. Only Societe Generale has been indicted for manipulating
the Libor, and the others are not known to have any current ongoing investigations.
Bank of America, Deutschbank and UBS have the smallest incentives to skew. Bar-
clays, the first bank to admit to manipulation, has the largest incentives, although the
estimate is not statistically significant. This may be due to a change in behavior over
the sample, as seems to be suggested by its quoting behavior in 2.5 and the regulatory
investigations. These investigations describe Barclays as moving from portfolio-driven
manipulation to a strategy designed to avoid damaging their reputation. See Snider and
Youle (2012) for a discussion of Barclays.
2.6.1 Recovering the Manipulation-Free Libor
I have estimated banks’ incentives to misreport β ≡ vi(xi)/(2δ). Now I construct a
“manipulation-free” Libor which would have occurred had their been no incentives to
manipulate the Libor by any bank. This is not the “correct” Libor because I have not
meaningfully recovered banks’ reputational reasons to misreport. Nevertheless, this
remains an interesting object to study. Manipulation driven misreporting is probably
the more likely source of future Libor distortion, as quotes will soon be anonymous – a
policy change that will mitigate banks’ concerns about their reputations.
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These counterfactual manipulation-free quotes q̂t are related to the observed quotes as
follows:
q̂it ≡ qit − β̂ ∂
∂qit
Li(qit, xt) (2.21)
The attendant manipulation-free Libor is defined from these quotes:
L̂t ≡ L(q̂t) (2.22)
The difference between this recovered Libor and the actual Libor, Lˆ − L, as well as a
90% confidence interval using the standard errors I compute in my estimate of the in-
centives β, is shown in figure 2.8. The Libor was largely accurate prior to the financial
crisis. Afterwards, however, it diverged downwards as the recovered Libor becomes
greater than the actual Libor. Eventually this leads to a nearly eight basis point dif-
ference at the end of my sample. This is well after the main storm of the crisis had
subsided and the Libor was at a very low level.
The difference between these Libors over time is driven by the evolution of marginal
impacts across banks. Generally speaking, most banks want to push it down and
marginal impacts rise during the crisis. There was more ability for manipulators to
alter the rate as the interquartile range of quotes increased during the financial crisis.
This initial increased dispersion was likely driven by the underlying dispersion in in-
terbank borrowing costs and greater market volatility in this period. In more peaceful
times, however, the truncation mechanism of the Libor works well and greatly dimin-
ishes banks abilities to misreport when their costs are tightly aligned.
2.7 Alternative Libor Aggregation
The FCA has considered alternative ways to form the Libor from the underlying quotes
from the panel banks.32 In particular, they examined alternative benchmarks caluclated
by the average and the median of submitted quotes, as well as a random quote selection.
32Wheatley (2012)
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Their analysis, however, was limited. They took the submitted quotes as given, and
examined how the Libor would have looked if it were computed from these quotes in
ways other than the interquartile mean. This approach ignores any behavioral responses
due to an alteration of the underlying mechanism.
In this section, I analyze these alternatives by recomputing the Bayesian-Nash equilib-
ria under alternative mechanisms.33 This approach takes the observable characteristics
and estimated portfolio incentives of banks as given and allows behavior to vary based
on the aggregation method used. I describe the process for calculating the Bayesian-
Nash equilibria of my model in detail.
2.7.1 Calculating Bayes-Nash Equilibria
As discussed above, the details of my model and environment lead to a number of
computational barriers. The first challenge is the high dimensionality of my game.
The second is the very real possibility of multiple equilibria. My solution involves
an algorithm similar to an EM-algorithm in maximum likelihood estimation, avoids
discretizing the state space, and can compute the bounds on the resulting Libors across
the set of possible equilibria.
I avoid the curse of dimensionality by exploiting the limited form of strategic interaction
in my model. A bank is only concerned about the behavior of the other banks insofar
as they alter its ability to manipulate the overall Libor. More specifically, the marginal
impact on the expected Libor is a sufficient statistic for the action profile of the other
banks when considering a given bank’s payoffs. This naturally leads to an algorithm
which simulates this marginal impact. My algorithm alternates between iterating on
bank’s first order conditions given their beliefs and then updating their beliefs about
33I don’t independently consider the random and the mean aggregation mechanisms because
my banks are risk neutral. Under random selection, where each bank has an equal probability
of being selected, leads to identical incentives for banks to submitting misleading quotes in my
model, and would generate identical behavior. The random aggregation mechanism, however,
would produce a more volatile Libor.
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their marginal impact given the current strategies played by the other banks stored in
memory. Rather than having to invert large matrices, my computational procedure
allows me to iterate on the first order conditions and then check that they are a global
optimum. Such a check is necessary because the Libor function is not concave and the
first order conditions are not sufficient for optimality.34
While I face a potentially large set of equilibria, the set is meaningfully bounded. This
is because the best response of every bank is bounded, and the bounds do not depend
on the strategy profiles of the other banks. Intuitively this is because banks face in-
creasing convex costs for misreporting and their marginal impact on the expected Libor
is bounded between zero and one eighth. No bank would skew more than they would
if there impact on the marginal Libor was always one eighth, and no bank would skew
in a direction contrary to these costs. These bounds on the best responses bound the
possible equilibria, and are common to the environment of Snider and Youle (2012)
where they are studied further.35
My approach is to initialize the values in my algorithm in such a way as to find the
extremal equilibria. The first minimizes the resulting equilibrium Libor and the latter
maximizes it. This then bounds the Libors resulting from all of the other equilibria in
my model. I find these extremal equilibria by weighting the banks that want to skew
it in that direction a maximal amount, and weighting the banks that wish to skew the
opposite direction a minimal amount. This leads the updating procedure to settle on
34This approach to computing the equilibrium is somewhat similar to computational meth-
ods developed for different environments. Krusell and Smith (1998) develops an algorithm to
compute macroeconomic models in which agents need to forecast the evolution of the wealth
distribution in order to forecast prices and make saving decisions. They find that the first mo-
ment of this distribution is a sufficent statistic for households to make nearly optimal decisions.
My algorithm to compute the Libor is also inspired by the algorithms of Pakes and McGuire
(2001) and Fershtman and Pakes (2012).
35It is possible that the multiplicity in my environment is reduced due to the incomplete
information version of my game. Bajari et al. (2010) find that an incomplete information version
of an entry game has considerably less equilibria as the number of players grow than when
information is complete. By the time they reach numbers of players near those in my game, the
set of possible equilibria has reduced drastically. Nevertheless, I aspire to be robust to multiple
equilibria in my counterfactual analysis by using these bounds.
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the extremal equilibrium. In the lowest Libor equilibrium banks which “short” the
Libor skew as aggressively as is consistent with individual rationality. Banks which are
“long” in the Libor do the same in the highest Libor equilibrium.
2.7.2 Iterative Algorithm
I repeatedly iterate upon the necessary first order conditions and use the resulting quotes
to update equilibrium beliefs until those beliefs converge. The pseudocode for my
algorithm is as follows. For each period t,
1. Initialize the beliefs G0 banks have about their equilibrium marginal impacts on
the expected Libor.
2. Begin an inner loop (iterating on m):
(a) Simulate S draws of cst using a calibrated cost process and the realized his-
tory of costs {cτ , στ}tτ=1.
(b) Generate the corresponding optimal quotes for each bank, using the neces-
sary first order condition and the current value of G:
qsit =
vi(xi)
2δ
Gm−1i + c
s
it
(c) Update the value of Gm using the simulated using fixed weights w ∈ (0, 1)
according to:
Gmi = wG
m−1
i + (1− w)
∑S
s=1 L(q
s
it + ∆, q
s
−it)− L(qsit, qs−it)
∆
(d) Continue until Gm converges.
3. Compute qt using the converged Gm and do a grid search to check the quotes
are truly optimal as the first order conditions are merely necessary. If they not
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optimal, I begin the process again for a different initialization of G0.
How G0 is initialized will typically determine the resulting equilibrium. The choice of
weights w govern the speed and reliability of the convergence of beliefs. I am able to
compute lowest-Libor equilibria by initializing those banks incentives to push the Libor
down with large G0i ’s and those with incentives to push the Libor up with G
0
i ’s of zero.
Every bank with Vi < 0 will skew their quotes downwards as much as possible. The
other banks won’t skew at all. This will likely not be consistent with equilibrium and
banks will revise their beliefs and consequently skew less. Over time this will converge
to the lowest possible Libor value that is consistent with individual rationality. I perform
the converse exercise to compute the highest-Libor equilibrium.
2.7.3 Alternative Libor Aggregation Mechanisms
My counterfactual results are presented in table 2.5. The mean has the largest system-
atic bias, the median has the least, and the interquartile range is intermediate. The poor
performance of the mean is due to the fact that manipulators are always able to skew ir-
respective of the other banks on the panel. Under the mean, there is no limit to skewing
aggressively, as there is no relationship between how far a bank skews from its peers
and its marginal impact. With the interquartile range the marginal impact of a bank’s
quote on the expected Libor is decreasing the more extreme the quote is, relative to the
others. This is especially so for the median. This is likely the reason why the median
performs so much better in the Bayes-Nash equilibria I compute.
An additional reason for the excellent accuracy of the median may be from a strate-
gic complementarity. I find that most banks wish to push the Libor downwards. If
other banks skew aggressively downwards, you are more willing to skew also, as this
increases the marginal impact of your rate when moving downwards. Under a median,
all banks skew less because their incentives are lessened, which then has knock on
affects due to this complementarity.
In table 2.5 I also calculate the yearly losses accruing to U.S. Municipalities under
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these alternative mechanisms. This is based on the estimate that municipalities held
$500 billion notional value of interest rate swaps during this period, in order to hedge
the floating rate municipal bonds, whose rates are determined in a competitive market.
It is also important to note that, as far as swaps market is concerned, this is a small
amount. Banks on the Libor panel routinely have trillions of dollars of notional value
interest rate swaps, as shown in their call reports. Nevertheless, these municipalities net
exposures’ are clear and they are a prominent class of institutions that suffered from a
depressed Libor.
2.8 Conclusion
The main problem with the Libor is that the interbank market in which it is determined
has become increasingly small. If instead the interbank market were thick and compet-
itive, banks would not have the ability to modify interest rates in a transactions-defined
Libor, nor would they have wide latitude to use expert judgment in a survey-defined
Libor. Regulators could also easily compare banks submitted quotes with actual trans-
actions. Unfortunately, the interbank market has been largely replaced by overnight
and collateralized forms of financing, and is unlikely to ever return to its prior, active
status.
The Libor, on the other hand, will remain an important benchmark for third party con-
tracts for the medium term. In the long run, however, it is entirely possible the market
will substitute away from contracts defined on the Libor towards close money market
substitutes, such as rates for repurchase agreements or certificates of deposit. In the
short run, many institutions which hold large portfolios of Libor denominated contracts
are eager to restore the credibility of the Libor(Wheatley (2012)).
I also suggest the Libor mechanism be modified to use only the median of the submitted
quotes. I find this can increase the accuracy of the Libor by over 70% in equilibrium.
This is because the largest manipulators are able to manipulate less on average, and by
smaller amounts.
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Table 2.1: Submitted Quotes (3M USD Libor; Week of 12/17/2007)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Barclays 5.03 5.03 5.00 4.99 4.95
HBOS 4.98 4.98 4.91 4.95 4.95
Deutsche Bank 4.97 4.96 4.93 4.90 4.85
Norinchukin 4.97 4.94 4.92 4.90 4.88
Bank of Tokyo 4.95 4.94 4.91 4.89 4.87
WestLB 4.95 4.94 4.92 4.89 4.87
RBC 4.95 4.93 4.91 4.88 4.85
Bank of America 4.94 4.93 4.92 4.88 4.86
UBS 4.94 4.91 4.90 4.88 4.86
Citigroup 4.94 4.91 4.90 4.89 4.85
Credit Suisse 4.93 4.93 4.91 4.81 4.871
2
Lloyds 4.93 4.92 4.92 4.85 4.85
HSBC 4.92 4.91 4.90 4.87 4.83
Rabobank 4.92 4.87 4.87 4.80 4.78
RBOS 4.91 4.90 4.90 4.85 4.80
J.P. Morgan 4.90 4.87 4.89 4.86 4.84
Libor 4.941
8
4.925
8
4.91 4.883
8
4.853
4
Snapshot of the raw quote data for the sixteen banks which compose the three month
U.S. dollar Libor which, along with the six month, is the most important for third
party dollar contracts. The Libor is calculated using the average of the middle eight
submitted quotes on each day. The bolded quotes are those which determine Monday’s
Libor rate.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Pre- and Post-Crisis Interquartile Ranges
Date 1/2/2007 10/21/2008
Barclays 5.36 Barclays 4.10
HBOS 5.36 Credit Suisse 4.00
Deutsche Bank 5.36 Norinchukin 3.95
Norinchukin 5.36 RBOS 3.95
Bank of Tokyo 5.36 WestLB 3.9
WestLB 5.36 Bank of Tokyo 3.9
RBC 5.36 HBOS 3.85
Bank of America 5.36 Deutsche Bank 3.85
UBS 5.36 UBS 3.85
Citigroup 5.36 RBC 3.82
Credit Suisse 5.36 Bank of America 3.75
Lloyds 5.36 HSBC 3.75
HSBC 5.36 Lloyds 3.7
Rabobank 5.36 Rabobank 3.6
J.P. Morgan 5.36 J.P. Morgan 3.55
RBOS 5.351
2
Citigroup 3.5
Libor 5.36 Libor 3.833
8
A comparison of quotes and interquartile ranges for two different days in the sample
period. Before the crisis, banks submitted very similar quotes and the interquartile
range was often small, as seen in the left panel. After the crisis, the interquartile range
expanded as banks submitted more hetergeneous quotes, as seen on the right.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics by Bank
Frequency Frequency Frequency
quote Below quote Within quote Above
Interquartile Interquartile Interquartile
Bank of Tokyo 0.4% 56.7% 42.9%
Bank of America 15.7% 63.4% 20.9%
Barclays 6.1% 60.0% 33.9%
J.P. Morgan 35.9% 58.7% 5.4%
Citigroup 22.5% 76.7% 0.8%
Credit Suisse 2.1% 84.9% 13.0%
DeutschBank 24.5% 63.0% 12.5%
HBOS 6.0% 85.1% 8.9%
HSBC 28.7% 70.4% 0.9%
Lloyds 10.6% 87.7% 1.7%
Norinchukin 0.7% 46.5% 52.8%
Rabobank 27.5% 69.4% 3.1%
RBC 5.3% 87.5% 7.2%
RBOS 33.5% 42.4% 24.1%
UBS 15.9% 77.3% 6.8%
WestLB 2.8% 83.7% 13.5%
The frequencies that the banks in the Libor panel participate below, within, and above
the interquartile range of the day’s submitted quotes. My identification strategy
involves exploiting the variation in this probability of participation over time, so it is
comforting to see there are no banks which either always or never participate.
67
Table 2.4: Estimating Necessary First Order Conditions; Second Stage
(Newey-West Standard Errors) Point Estimates (
Vi
2δ
) Average Skew (bp)
N=1025
1 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi - -
2 Bank of America -0.66 -3.04
(0.26) (1.19)
3 Barclays -5.29 -13.47
(9.62) (24.47)
4 J.P.Morgan -3.52 -7.90
(1.25) (2.81)
5 Citigroup -1.05 -6.19
(0.35) (2.04)
6 Credit Suisse 0.91 5.34
(0.34) (2.00)
7 Deutschbank 0.34 1.51
(0.17) (0.75)
8 Societe Generale/HBOS - -
9 HSBC -0.96 -4.34
(0.30) (1.33)
10 Lloyds -1.28 -8.41
(0.56) (3.68)
11 Norinchukin1 - -
12 Rabobank -0.82 -4.00
(0.95) (4.63)
13 Royal Bank of Canada2 - -
14 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.70 2.15
(0.26) (0.80)
15 UBS 0.38 2.36
(0.09) (0.58)
16 WestLB3 - -
Fixed Effects; Bank-Quarter Effects
Additional Controls: 1 Year Senior CDS Spreads by bank
Commerical Paper Rate
Fed Funds Effective Rate
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Table 2.5: Alternative Libor Mechanisms (Q3 2009)
Average of
Random or Mean Median
Middle Eight
Average distortion from
counterfactual Libor -3.0bp -4.7bp 0.0bp
Variance 0.57 0.77 0.53
Sum of squared errors 6.8bp 17.1bp 1.3bp
from counterfactual Libor
Loss to U.S.
$150 mill. $235 mill. $0
Municipalities (per year)
The counterfactual analysis of alternative Libor aggregation mechanisms. A
Bayes-Nash equilibria is computed where manipulators have rational expectations and
full awareness of the exact mechanism.
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